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Introduction
FOLLOWING THE COLLAPSE OF Studebaker's pension plan in
1963, Congress enacted the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), a comprehensive national standard designed
to protect employee benefits.' Among those protected benefits are
employer-sponsored welfare plans, including "benefits in the event of
sickness, accident, disability, [and] death."2 Plan participants and
their beneficiaries who allege improper plan administration must first
exercise their right to appeal directly to the plan administrator before
bringing a case in federal court.3 This appeals process is an integral
* Class of 2009; B.A., University of California, Berkeley, 2006. Thanks to Uncle
Bruce and my editors Amy Lifson-Leu and Aileen Pang for their invaluable help.
1. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (a) (2000); see also S. REP. No. 98-221 (1984) (discussing the
first decade of ERISA); JOHN H. LANGBEIN ET AL., PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW
72-76 (4th ed. 2006); STEVENJ. SACHER ET AL., EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW 5-7 (2d ed. 2000).
See generally James A. Wooten, "The Most Glorious Story of Failure in the Business": The Stude-
baker-Packard Corporation and the Origins of ERISA, 49 BuFF. L. REV. 683 (2001) (arguing that
the closure of a Studebaker plant and its underfunded pension plan was a catalyst for
federal employee benefit reform).
2. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (defining an "employee welfare benefit plan" as "any plan...
established or maintained by an employer... for the purpose of providing for its partici-
pants or their beneficiaries . .. benefits in the event of sickness, accident, disability, [or]
death," among other things); id. § 1003(a) (stating that ERISA "shall apply to any em-
ployee benefit plan"). But see id. § 1003(b) (exempting governmental and church plans
from ERISA coverage).
3. See id. § 1133(2); ERISA Claims Procedure Rule, 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(h)(1)
(2007).
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part of the Act, designed to create a system of internal review and
administrative remedies. 4
ERISA statutorily requires that plans give participants a "full and
fair review" of an initial claim determination where the participant
exercises his right to an administrative appeal. 5 If the plan denies the
appeal, it must provide the participant with the documents relied
upon.6 The regulations make clear that those documents must be pro-
vided upon an adverse determination on appeal. 7 However, whether
appeal-level documents must be provided during the course of an ap-
peal remains an open question.
The Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have each considered this
issue, but none offer a clear rule regarding if, or when, plans must
provide participants access to documents during the course of an ap-
peal.8 The precedents on point in each circuit are narrowly tailored to
the cases' facts and therefore provide no broadly applicable rule. Each
circuit appears to hold differently, depending on whether the appeal
denial is found to be based upon a novel theory. They seek to deter-
mine whether the plan relies on a novel theory when it denies the
appellate claim on different grounds from the original claim denial.
As a result of this narrow focus, plan administrators are left to infer
the rules from the ambiguous language of the various decisions. None
of the three circuits provide a clear general policy to guide plans or a
set of rights that participants can rely on.9
This Comment argues that a bright-line rule that does not require
access to documents during the appeal is most efficient and beneficial
to the parties. Such a rule is consistent with the Department of La-
bor's ("DOL") intent and avoids complex timing issues that could un-
necessarily prolong the administrative process. Adopting this type of
4. See sources cited supra note 3.
5. 29 U.S.C. § 1133(2).
6. 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(i) (5).
7. Id.
8. See Metzger v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 476 F.3d 1161, 1165-68 (10th Cir.
2007); Abatie v. Alta Health & Life Ins. Co., 458 F.3d 955, 973-74 (9th Cir. 2006); Abram v.
Cargill, Inc., 395 F.3d 882, 886 (8th Cir. 2005).
9. See, e.g., Niles v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. 04-4060, 2007 WL 30607, at *12 (D. Kan.
Jan. 3, 2007) (holding that the plan did not violate full and fair review because of the
potential for an interminable review process); Hornback v. N.Y. Times Co. Long Term
Disability Plan, No. 05-00508, 2006 WL 496050, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2006) (demon-
strating the confusion surrounding the Abram holding and its application to cases with
slightly different facts); Harris v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 379 F. Supp. 2d 1366, 1373-74 (N.D.
Ga. 2005) (holding that the plan violated full and fair review by not allowing the claimant
to respond to appeal-level documents, despite the potential for interminable review
process).
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bright-line rule would also eliminate the growing confusion created by
the conflicting circuit court opinions. However, in the interest of pre-
serving true "full and fair review" within the legislative intent and com-
mon-sense meaning of the phrase, there should be some incentive for
plan administrators to provide participants access to appeal docu-
ments when practical.
The DOL should add a new regulation in its next set of amend-
ments to clarify that the scope of full and fair review does not require
access to appeal-level documents during an appeal. This regulation
should acknowledge that the best approach is to encourage access by
creating an incentive for plans to provide documents without dis-
rupting the careful balance of the competing interests at stake. The
regulation should allow plans to avoid liability for violating full and
fair review by providing the claimant with access to appeal-level docu-
ments at least fifteen days before final determination of the appeal. If
the plan does not provide the claimant access to those documents
within the fifteen-day buffer, it should face a rebuttable presumption
of denying the claimant a full and fair review. 10
Most importantly, the new bright-line rule will clarify the law in
an area currently plagued with ambiguity due to the conflicting circuit
court opinions. Employer-sponsored welfare plans, including disabil-
ity, life insurance, and accidental death and dismemberment plans,
are too important to be governed by a muddled and inconsistent ap-
peals process. Plans have too much money on the line, and claimants
have their own well-being at stake. Even if the varying circuit court
decisions have avoided clear conflict by clinging closely to the specific
facts of each case, they have left the issue largely unresolved. As long
as plans, claimants, lawyers, and the courts perceive the potential for a
split in authority or are unclear on the scope of full and fair review,
this highly regulated field will be unnecessarily complicated for all
parties.
Part I of this Comment explains the background issues and sum-
marizes the "full and fair review" appeals process. Part II looks at the
three main circuit court cases at issue. Part III examines the perceived
circuit split and the confusion it creates. Part IV addresses the
problems that plague the current state of the law. Part V proposes a
new regulation to resolve the issues associated with the appeal-level
10. The remedy for denial of full and fair review is beyond the scope of this Com-
ment. See generally Elliot v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 473 F.3d 613, 621-23 (6th Cir. 2006) (dis-
cussing different circuit court remedies for denying full and fair review, including
awarding benefits and remanding to the plan administrator).
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reports. Finally, Part VI discusses the potential benefits of the pro-
posed regulatory amendment.
I. The Appeals Process: Full and Fair Review
ERISA procedures require that plans provide an appeals process
when a claim for benefits is denied."I In most situations, plan partici-
pants must appeal the initial claim denial, thereby exhausting their
administrative remedies, before bringing a suit in federal court to
challenge the denial.' 2 The plan participant has the right to a "full
and fair review" of his or her claim during the appeals process. 13
ERISA requires that plans "afford a reasonable opportunity to any
participant whose claim for benefits has been denied for a full and fair
review by the appropriate named fiduciary of the decision denying the
claim."'1 4 The regulations set out in some detail what "full and fair
review" requires. 15 In the context of an appeal, "a claimant shall be
provided, upon request and free of charge, reasonable access to, and
copies of, all documents, records, and other information relevant to
the claimant's claim for benefits." 16
The regulations then focus on defining what a relevant document
is, rather than determining at what point of an appeals process a par-
ticipant will have access to it.17 The focus appears to be entirely on
documents relied upon in the original claim determination prior to
the appeal and appeal-level documents after the appeal.' 8 By concen-
trating only on the question of document relevance at the point of
denial, the DOL fails to address the issue of whether a participant has
11. See 29 U.S.C. § 1133(2) (2000); ERISA Claims Procedure Rule, 29 C.F.R.
§ 2560.503-1(h) (1) (2007).
12. See Amato v. Bernard, 618 F.2d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding that the
Secretary of Labor's promulgation of 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1 demonstrates the Depart-
ment's intent to require exhaustion of administrative remedies in most cases); see also La-
Rue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Associates, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1020, 1027 (2008) (Roberts, C.J.,
concurring) (stating that most circuits have found the exhaustion of administrative reme-
dies requirement, but leaving the issue unsettled); Fallick v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 162
F.3d 410, 418 n.4 (6th Cir. 1998) (listing numerous circuit court decisions finding a re-
quirement that the participant exhaust administrative remedies).
13. 29 U.S.C. § 1133(2).
14. Id.
15. 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(h).
16. Id. § 2560.503(h) (2) (iii).
17. See id. § 2560.503-1(m)(8) (defining relevant documents).
18. See id. § 2560.503-1(m) (8) (i) (noting that a document is relevant if it "[w]as relied
upon in making the benefit determination"); id. § 2560.503-1(i) (5) (providing document
access upon an adverse determination on review).
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access to appeal-level documents during the appeal. As a consequence,
timing issues are not regulated with sufficient precision.
The regulations that do address timing issues fail to clarify a
plan's obligation to provide access to documents during the course of
an appeal. The only regulation that directly addresses the issue of ac-
cess to documents created during the review states: "In the case of an
adverse benefit determination on review, the plan administrator shall
provide such access to, and copies of, documents, records, and other
information [relied upon] ... i.19 Of course, this only applies to ac-
cess after the appeal has been completed since it applies only to an
adverse determination. Whether or not a participant is to have access
during the appeal is left unclear.
The central timing requirement for welfare plans states that "the
plan administrator shall notify a claimant . .. of the plan's benefit
determination on review within a reasonable period of time, but not
later than 60 days after receipt of the claimant's request for review by
the plan," which creates a general sixty-day framework for appeals. 20
This explicit time limit defining the outer reaches of what is reasona-
ble for the length of an appeals process is crucial for the participant,
who presumably wants a determination made as quickly as possible
and within a predictable time frame. However, access to appeal-level
documents during the course of an appeal may threaten this sixty-day
limit and therefore undermine the regulation's intended protection
for plan participants. 2 1
II. The Cases
The Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have all ruled on a partici-
pant's right to access to appeal-level documents during the course of
an appeal. 22 The Eighth and Ninth Circuits held that the plan must
provide the participant access,23 while the Tenth Circuit held that the
plan is not required to provide access. 24 However, the differing facts of
19. Id. § 2560.503-1 (i) (5).
20. Id. § 2560.503-1(i) (1) (i). But see id. § 2560.503-1(i) (2) (i) (creating a special sev-
enty-two-hour review process for urgent claims); id. § 2560.503-1(i) (3) (i) (shortening the
appeal process to forty-five days for disability claims).
21. See discussion infra Part W.A.
22. Metzger v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 476 F.3d 1161 (10th Cir. 2007); Abatie v.
Alta Health & Life Ins. Co., 458 F.3d 955, 973-74 (9th Cir. 2006); Abram v. Cargill, Inc.,
395 F.3d 882 (8th Cir. 2005).
23. Abram, 395 F.3d at 886; Abatie, 458 F.3d at 974.
24. Metzger, 476 F.3d at 1167.
Fall 20081
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
each case and the careful language of each holding have done more
to confuse the issue than to resolve it.25
A. The Eighth Circuit Requires Access to Appeal-Level Documents
During the Course of an Appeal if the Plan Relies on
New Information
In Abram v. Cargill, Inc.,26 the plaintiff and plan participant
Abram lost her appeal of the denial of her long-term disability claim. 27
Abram claimed she could not work the required forty hours per week
due to fatigue caused by Post-Polio Syndrome, and her doctor sup-
ported this claim by concluding that she was disabled. 28 The plan ad-
ministrator denied Abram's claim based on a determination by an
independent physician that Abram was capable of performing her
mostly sedentary work duties and that her obesity and depression
caused the fatigue.29
Abram then appealed the denial and underwent a functional ca-
pacity evaluation ("FCE") to substantiate her claim of disabling fa-
tigue.30 The FCE results were sent to the independent physician, who
in turn provided a second report to the plan administrator.3' This
second opinion from the physician determined that the FCE was in-
conclusive because it tested her based only on a six-hour work day.3 2
The physician found that if Abram was capable of performing her du-
ties during the six-hour tests, there was no reason to believe she could
not perform them for the full eight-hour workday.33 Based on this
opinion, the plan administrator denied Abram's appeal.3 4 Abram was
not provided with the crucial second report from the independent
examiner until her appeal was denied. 35
25. See Elizabeth J. Bondurant & Ronald Dean, Update on ERISA Litigation, SL099
A.L.I.-A.B.A. 81, 122-24 (2006) (reviewing recent full and fair review cases); Mala M. Rafik,
ERISA Updates-The Year in Review, 2 Ann. 2007 A.A.J.-C.L.E. 1687 (2007) (same).
26. 395 F.3d 882 (8th Cir. 2005).
27. Id. at 885.
28. Id. at 883-85.
29. Id. at 884-85.
30. Id. at 885.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
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The Eighth Circuit found that the plan did not provide Abram
the required full and fair review in her appeal. 36 The plan failed to
comply because:
Abram was not provided access to the second report by [the inde-
pendent physician] that served as the basis for the Plan's denial of
benefits until after the Plan's decision. Without knowing what "in-
consistencies" the Plan was attempting to resolve or having access
to the report the Plan relied on, Abram could not meaningfully
participate in the appeals process. 37
Thus, the court held that Abram could only have been provided a
full and fair review of her claim if she had access to the appeal-level
report created by the plan's medical consultant before the plan's final
determination on her appeal. 38 The court explained that access was
required in this case:
There can hardly be a meaningful dialogue between the claimant
and the Plan administrators if evidence is revealed only after a final
decision. A claimant is caught off guard when new information
used by the appeals committee emerges only with the final denial.
Abram should have been permitted to review and respond to the
report by [the independent physician].3 9
Taken at face value, the court's decision appears to hold that full
and fair review requires that the plan participant have access to ap-
peal-level reports during the course of the appeal, at least if the plan
relies on undisclosed evidence discovered during the appeal. 40 This
policy guarantees that the participant will have the chance to view the
documents during the appeals process and therefore presumably have
the opportunity for a full and fair review. The next appellate court to
undertake this issue, with slightly different facts, came to the same
conclusion.
B. The Ninth Circuit Requires Access to Appeal-Level Documents
During the Course of an Appeal if the Plan Relies on an
Additional Ground for Denial
1. The Case
In Abatie v. Alta Health & Life Ins. Co.,4" Dr. Abatie contracted
non-Hodgkin's lymphoma, had to leave his job, and then went on dis-
36. Id. at 886.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. (citation omitted).
40. Id.
41. Abatie v. Alta Health & Life Ins. Co., 458 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 2006).
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ability for the final seven years of his life.42 When he died in 2000, the
beneficiaries under his employer-sponsored life insurance plan filed a
claim for their benefits. 43 Alta, the insurance company, denied the
claim because Dr. Abatie had failed to submit proof of his "total" disa-
bility to the plan administrator within twelve months of becoming dis-
abled, as the plan required.44 Alta again denied the claim after Dr.
Abatie's beneficiaries appealed the decision. 45 However, Alta added a
new reason for denying the claim, stating there was insufficient evi-
dence that Dr. Abatie remained "totally" disabled from the time he
left work until his death.4 6
The Ninth Circuit found that this appeal-level "tacking on" of a
new reason for denying the participant's claim violated the require-
ment of a full and fair review. 47 The court held that "an administrator
that adds, in its final decision, a new reason for denial, a maneuver
that has the effect of insulating the rationale from review, contravenes
the purpose of ERISA."48 The holding was based on an interpretation
of the full and fair review section of ERISA,49 which the court deter-
mined "suggests that the specific reasons provided must be reviewed
at the administrative level." 50
2. Reconciling Abram and Abatie
Abram and Abatie are similar in many ways, but the issue presented
in each case is slightly different. In Abram, the insurance company
changed its reason for denying the claim on review. 51 The original
denial was based on the participant's depression, but the plan based
its final denial on appeal on the inconclusive results of an FCE. 52 In
Abatie, the Ninth Circuit opened the door somewhat wider in holding
that a full and fair review may require appellate-level access not only
when the plan switches to an entirely novel theory, but also when the
plan merely adds a new theory to that of the original denial. 53 Just
how far-reaching the Ninth Circuit intended its holding to be is un-
42. Id. at 959-60.
43. Id. at 960.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 961.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 974.
48. Id.
49. 29 U.S.C. § 1133(2) (2000).
50. Abatie, 458 F.3d at 974.
51. Abram v. Cargill, Inc., 395 F.3d 882, 885 (8th Cir. 2005).
52. Id. at 884-85.
53. Abatie, 458 F.3d at 974.
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clear. There is nothing to explicitly limit the Ninth Circuit's rule to
the "tacking on" situation presented by the facts of the Abatie case,
leaving open the possibility that the court intended to cover access to
all appellate-level documents regardless of any novel theory on review.
However, the facts in Abram and Abatie, along with the language
used in both opinions, suggest a narrower and more nuanced prece-
dent that does not cover all appeal-level documents. More impor-
tantly, neither case satisfactorily addresses the complex balancing of
the interests and timing issues at stake in the ERISA appeals process.
Nor does either case provide clear guidance in creating a general pol-
icy to ensure participants are provided the requisite full and fair re-
view in the future. In Metzger v. UNUM Life Insurance Co. of America,54
however, the Tenth Circuit grappled with some of the questions left
unanswered by the Eighth and Ninth Circuits.
C. The Tenth Circuit Does Not Require Access to Appeal-Level
Documents During the Course of an Appeal, at Least
When the Plan Does Not Rely on a Novel
Ground
1. The Case and Its Flawed Holding
In Metzger v. UNUM Life Insurance Co. of America, the plaintiff
claimed her employer-sponsored disability benefits by citing a number
of conditions that she argued rendered her unable to work.55 The
defendant plan denied her claim based on the report of a medical
consultant, who found she was neither under the regular care of a
doctor nor was she "totally disabled" as defined by the plan.5 6
When Metzger appealed, the plan sent her files to two medical
professionals not involved in the original denial in order to review her
claim and determine if the plan's denial was warranted. 57 Both medi-
cal professionals returned reports confirming the validity of the de-
nial.58 The plan did not provide Metzger access to these appeal-level
documents until after denying the appeal because "they contained no
new factual information and recommended denial on the same
grounds as the initial claim determination. '59
54. 476 F.3d 1161 (10th Cir. 2007).
55. Id. at 1162-63.
56. See id. at 1163.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
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Unlike Abram and Abatie, the Metzger court held that full and fair
review did not require that the plan participant have access to the
appeal-level documents during the course of her review.60 Further-
more, the court used sweeping language to indicate a broad scope for
the case's precedent. The court held that "subsection (h) (2) (iii) does
not require a plan administrator to provide a claimant with access to
the medical opinion reports of appeal-level reviewers prior to a final
decision on appeal. ' 61 The court went on to state that full and fair
review only requires the plan to furnish relevant documents to the
participant at the outset and conclusion of an appeal. 62
However, the court was careful to distinguish itself from the other
circuits by emphasizing the factual differences between the Metzger
case and the Abram and Abatie cases.63 Unlike those cases, the plan in
Metzger denied the participant's appeal on the same grounds as in the
original determination. 64 The court seemingly ignores this point until
one crucial sentence that immediately follows the announcement of
its holding: "So long as appeal-level reports analyze evidence already
known to the claimant and contain no new factual information or
novel diagnoses, this two-phase disclosure [at the outset and conclu-
sion of the appeal] is consistent with 'full and fair review.' "65 This
sentence undermines the broader precedential value of the court's
holding by failing to consider what rule would apply where the appeal-
level reports do contain new factual information or novel diagnoses.
Thus, although the court initially painted its holding with a broad
brush, it fails to clarify the law in any situation but the one it was
presented with. 66
60. Id. at 1167.
61. Id.
62. Id. (citation omitted).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1163.
65. Id. at 1167.
66. See, e.g., Skipp v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., No. 06-2199, 2008 WL 346107, at *10-11
(D. Md. Feb. 6, 2008) (characterizing the Metzger decision as a bright-line rule against
requiring access, but then confusing matters by concluding that "[t]here was nothing in
[the appeal-level] report that would have caught [the participant] off guard"). But see, e.g.,
Forrester v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., No. 04-1204, 2005 WL 3429542, at *14 (D. Kan. Dec. 8,
2005), affd, 232 F. App'x 758 (10th Cir. 2007) (relying on Metzger and holding that "there
is no obligation in the regulations or elsewhere for the proposition that the claimant essen-
tially has a right to immediate production and right to rebuttal to additional medical
records and opinions generated after the initial denial of claim and prior to any resolution
of the appeal").
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2. The Effect of the Amended Regulations
The Metzger court grounded its holding in an interpretation of
new regulatory amendments. 67 Prior to the amendments, the Code of
Federal Regulations ("CFR') required only that a plan participant be
able to "[r]eview pertinent documents." 68 As amended in 2000, the
regulations attempt to specify which documents are pertinent (or, as
the amended version calls them, "relevant") to an appeal. The CFR's
language, however, does not clearly identify when a participant should
be granted access to appeal-level documents during the appeals pro-
cess. The most relevant regulation states that the plan must ensure
"that a claimant shall be provided, upon request and free of charge,
reasonable access to, and copies of, all documents, records, and other
information relevant to the claimant's claim for benefits. ' 69 The CFR
does define relevance, but apparently only in the context of docu-
ments the plan must provide at the outset and conclusion of an ap-
peal. 70 As the Metzger court notes, the language does not directly
address documents created during the appeals process.7 1
The Metzger court relied upon the DOL's motives for the amend-
ment tojustify its regulatory interpretation.7 2 The DOL states that sec-
tion (m) (8) was adopted to provide claimants with "adequate access to
the information necessary to determine whether to pursue further ap-
peal. ' 73 This suggests that the documents are to be provided at the
end of the appeal process so that the plan participant has the requisite
information to determine whether or not to bring a case in federal
district court.
Perhaps the most important aspect of the Metzger court's reason-
ing is that it did not find the Abram decision convincing because the
Abram court did not consider "circularity of review, ' 74 a concept refer-
ring to an endless cycle of plans furnishing documents, participants
rebutting those documents with their own documents, and the pro-
67. Metzger, 476 F.3d at 1166.
68. ERISA Claims Procedure Rule, 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(g) (1) (ii) (1999).
69. ERISA Claims Procedure Rule, 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(h) (2) (iii) (2007).
70. See id. § 2560.503-1 (in) (8) (defining "relevant documents" as "[documents] sub-
mitted, considered, or generated in the course of making the benefit determination,"
among other things).
71. Metzger, 476 F.3d at 1166.
72. Id. at 1167.
73. ERISA Claims Procedure, 65 Fed. Reg. 70,246, 70,252 (Nov. 21, 2000) (codified at
29 C.F.R pt. 2560).
74. Metzger, 476 F.3d at 1167 n.3.
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cess repeating itself ad infinitum. 75 The Metzger court was worried that
requiring appeal-level access would create an endless loop of docu-
ment production and responses, thereby threatening the important
time limitations on administrative review and increasing the cost of
the appeals process.7 6
The Metzger court stated that the Abram court did not consider
circularity of review because the decision was based on pre-amend-
ment regulations. 77 Curiously, the Metzger court did not explain why
the plan and participant would face the prospect of getting trapped in
an administrative cycle under the amended code, but would not face
that danger under the previous code.
The Metzger court appears to have relied on the addition of C.F.R.
§ 2560.503-1 (h) (3) (iii) as the crucial distinction between the
amended and previous codes.78 The regulation requires plans to con-
sult with appropriate medical professionals to determine the validity
of a participant's appeal. 79 The Metzger court interpreted the regula-
tion as requiring the plan to consult a medical professional to address
a participant's rebuttal to appeal-level documents.80 The court deter-
mined that the cost of such a consultation would be a substantial detri-
ment to the plan and that the time it would take for such consultation
would be a substantial detriment to the participant, with both being
contrary to statutory and regulatory intent.81 Even in the situation
presented by the Metzger case, where there are no new facts or novel
diagnoses determining the appeal, access to appeal-level documents
has the potential to seriously disrupt the administrative process by re-
quiring costly, time-consuming, and ultimately pointless medical
consultations.8 2
75. Id. at 1166 ("[I]f read according to plaintiff's view, the regulations set up an end-
less loop of opinions rendered under (h) (3) (iii), followed by rebuttal from plaintiffs ex-
perts, followed by more opinions under (h) (3) (iii), and so on.").
76. Id. at 1166-67.
77. Id. at 1167 n.3.
78. Id. at 1166.
79. ERISA Claims Procedure Rule, 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(h) (3) (iii) (2007).
80. Metzger, 476 F.3d at 1166.
81. Id. at 1166-67.
82. Id.
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HI. The Ambiguous Circuit Court Decisions Leave the Law
Unsettled
All three circuit court decisions appear to limit their holdings to
the nuanced facts each case presented. 83 As a result, there is no gen-
eral consensus on how to handle access to documents during an
appeal.8 4
A. The Eighth and Tenth Circuits: The Crucial Distinction
Between Whether or Not the Plan Relies on a Novel
Ground
The Eighth Circuit found that the plan denied the participant a
full and fair review by not providing document access during the ap-
peal, but the Tenth Circuit did not.8 5 However, the cases' facts are
different enough to question whether or not the decisions create a
circuit split. A subsequent district court case in the Eighth Circuit
sheds some light on how courts view the conflict.86
1. Despite Reaching Opposite Conclusions, the Two Decisions Do
Not Create a Clear Conflict
The Eighth Circuit in Abram held that when a plan relies on a
novel diagnosis to deny an appeal, the participant has a right to the
newly relied-upon documents before the appeal is denied.8 7 This pro-
vides the participant with the chance to rebut the new opinion and
therefore the opportunity for full and fair review. 88 The Tenth Circuit
in Metzger, however, held that when a plan relies upon a report that,
while new, does not contain any novel diagnoses, the plan participant
does not have a right to those documents before the appeal is de-
nied.89 According to that court, full and fair review does not require
83. Id. at 1167; Abatie v. Alta Health & Life Ins. Co., 458 F.3d 955, 974 (9th Cir. 2006);
Abram v. Cargill, Inc., 395 F.3d 882, 886 (8th Cir. 2005).
84. See Hall v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 259 F. App'x 589, 593-94 (4th Cir. 2007) (holding
that a participant is entitled to a full and fair review of only the initial grounds for denial,
even if the appeal is denied on a different ground); Robinson v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 443
F.3d 389, 393 (5th Cir. 2006) (holding that a participant is entitled to review of the specific
grounds for a benefits denial, and therefore a plan violates the participant's right to a full
and fair review if it denies an appeal on a novel ground without first notifying the
participant).
85. Abram, 395 F.3d at 886; Metzger, 476 F.3d at 1167.
86. See Lammers v. Am. Express Long Term Disability Benefit Plan, No. 06-CV-1099,
2007 WL 2247594 (D. Minn. Aug. 2, 2007).
87. Abram, 395 F.3d at 886.
88. Id.
89. Metzger, 476 F.3d at 1167.
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access to the appeal-level documents in this situation because the plan
is relying on the same theory as in the claim's original denial. 9°1
These holdings as described above are actually consistent with
each other. In declining to follow Abram, the Metzger court believed
Abram's holding to be "that full and fair review requires an administra-
tor to make appeal-level consultants' reports available to claimants
during the course of an appeal."9' The court read Abram as creating a
bright-line rule requiring that plan administrators provide partici-
pants with appeal-level reports solicited by the plan from a medical
consultant during an appeal.92 The Tenth Circuit nevertheless did not
believe it was contravening the Abram holding because it relied on the
amended regulations that were not applied in the Eighth Circuit's
analysis in Abram.93
But Metzgds reading of Abram is just one possible interpretation,
and, by all evidence, not the correct one.94 In Abram, the defendant
relied upon new evidence gathered from the participant's FCE as
grounds for denying her appeal. 95 The court underscored the incon-
sistency between the plan's original and appeal-level denials, and ra-
tionalized its decision by explaining its fear that plans may hold their
cards until forced to put them on the table.9 6 The court emphasized
that "[a] claimant is caught off guard when new information used by
the appeals committee emerges only with the final denial. '97 Thus,
there is little, if anything, in the opinion to suggest that the court's
interpretation of full and fair review is as expansive as the Metzger
court insinuates. Rather, it appears that the Abram court limited its
holding to situations where the plan relies on a novel piece of evi-
dence or diagnosis to deny an appeal.
2. A District Court in the Eighth Circuit Sides with Abram
In Lammers v. American Express Long Term Disability Benefit Plan,98
the plan relied on an appeal-level opinion from an independent medi-
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1167 n.3.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. See Abram v. Cargill, Inc., 395 F.3d 882, 886 (8th Cir. 2005) (appearing to limit its
holding, which found a denial of full and fair review, to situations where the plan relies on
a novel ground on review).
95. Id. at 885.
96. See id. at 886.
97. Id.
98. No. 06-CV-1099, 2007 ATL 2247594 (D. Minn. Aug. 2, 2007).
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cal examiner (finding that the claimant was capable of working full-
time) to deny the appeal.99 As in Abram, the plan did not provide the
relevant documentation of the appeal-level opinion to the claimant
before denying his appeal. °00 The Lammers court acknowledged the
ambiguities in Abram in attempting to apply it to the instant case:' 0 '
Abram is a relatively recent opinion, and its precise scope is far
from clear. But Abram seems to require that, if the plan administra-
tor solicits a medical opinion at any time during the proceedings-
including during an appeal-the claimant must be informed of
that medical opinion and given a meaningful opportunity to re-
spond to it before the final decision is reached. 10 2
On this ground, the court held that the plan denied Lammers his
right to a full and fair review. 10 3
However, the Lammers court did not come to its conclusion with-
out addressing the defendant's reliance on Metzger.10 4 The court
stated that
[i]n Metzger, the court held that an ERISA plan was not required to
disclose an appeal-level physician report to a claimant prior to the
plan's final benefit decision, because to do so would create a
lengthy cycle of submission and review, prolonging the appeals
process. Inefficiency concerns, however, cannot surmount ERISA's
full and fair review mandate. 10 5
This emphasis on the inherent full and fair review requirements dem-
onstrates the court's belief that the regulations relied upon in Metzger
should not control. The district court went on to clarify this distinc-
tion and ultimately sided with Abram's analysis:
Moreover, the Court rejects Metzger's attempt to distinguish Abram.
In Metzger, the court reasoned that 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1, a De-
partment of Labor regulation regarding "full and fair review," had
been amended to indicate that an ERISA plan must only provide
an employee with documents generated during the initial claim
denial, not during the appeal stage. The Metzger court held that,
because Abram filed her claim before the regulatory amendment
was effective, the Abram decision was not persuasive. Abram, how-
ever, was rooted in ERISA's fundamental "full and fair review" re-
quirement, 29 U.S.C. § 1133(2), and ERISA's core goal of
facilitating a fair dialogue between plan and claimant, both of
99. Id. at *4.
100. Id.; Abram, 395 F.3d at 885.
101. Lammers, 2007 WL 2247594, at *2.
102. Id.
103. Id. at *5.
104. Id. at *6.
105. Id. (citation omitted).
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which have remained constant, not on an interpretation of 29
C.F.R. § 2560.503-1.106
Even if the regulations control, the Lammers court believed that
the Metzger court interpreted them incorrectly. 107 The Lammers court
stated that
the regulatory language upon which Metzger relies, 29 C.F.R.
§ 2560.503-1 (in) (8), requires a plan to disclose documents used in
making the "benefit determination." The regulation's plain lan-
guage, therefore, is not narrowly confined to the initial benefit de-
termination, as Metzger improperly concludes, but rather requires
ERISA plans to disclose relevant documents during any phase of
the "benefit determination," including at the appeal level.' 08
The district court in Lammers therefore declared Metzger to be incor-
rect on multiple levels, providing a much starker contrast than the
Eighth Circuit offered in Abram.
Finally, the Lammers court took one extra step to ensure that the
"circularity of review" issue in Metzger would not hamstring the Abram
holding. 109 It stated:
To be clear: The Court does not understand Abram to require that
Lammers be given an opportunity to submit new medical evidence
in response to the new reports. If claimants had such a right, the
result would be an endless cycle in which each new medical opin-
ion solicited by the plan administrator would be met by new medi-
cal evidence submitted by the claimant that would have to be the
subject of yet another medical opinion solicited by the plan admin-
istrator that would then be met by yet more medical evidence sub-
mitted by the claimant. The plan administrator must be able to
close the evidentiary record at some point .... Thus, although
Lammers must be given an opportunity to respond [to the opin-
ions relied upon in the initial denial], Abram does not give Lam-
mers the right to respond with new medical evidence.110
While this effectively avoids one of the chief concerns in Metzger,
the Lammers court's approach is hard to reconcile with the require-
ments of a full and fair review.1 1' The opportunity to view appeal-level
documents lacks any significant meaning in the context of a full and
fair review if the claimant has no opportunity to respond with medical
evidence. 1 12
106. Id. (citation omitted).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at *2.
110. Id.
111. But see Glazer v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 524 F.3d 1241, 1245-46 (11th
Cir. 2008) (adopting the Metzger approach of not requiring access to appeal-level
documents).
112. See discussion infra Part VI.A.
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B. The Ninth Circuit: The Additional Novel Ground in Abatie
Requires the Same Document Access as the Alternate
Novel Ground in Abram
The Abatie case contains a level of nuance in its reasoning that is
absent in both Metzger and Abram. In the latter cases, the plan relied
on the same theory as the original denial in one case and a novel
theory in the other, respectively. 113 The issue in Abatie was the plan's
"tacking on" of a novel ground for denial upon one that was already
disclosed in the initial denial.1 1 4
In other words, the Eighth Circuit held that a plan fails to provide
a full and fair review if it initially denies a claim for reason A, then
denies the appeal for reason B without first notifying the participant
and allowing him to review and respond.1 1 5 The Tenth Circuit held
that a plan does not fail to provide a full and fair review if it denies the
appeal for reason A (the same as the initial denial) without providing
the participant access to new appeal-level documentation supporting
the denial beforehand.1 1 6 The question in Abatie was whether a plan
fails to provide a full and fair review when it denies the appeal for
reason A and B without first notifying the participant and allowing
him to review and respond to B.117 According to the Ninth Circuit,
tacking on a new ground onto the appellate denial violates the plan
participant's right to a full and fair review. 18
As in Abram, the Ninth Circuit was careful to circumscribe the
reach of its ruling. The court stated that "an administrator that adds,
in its final decision, a new reason for denial, a maneuver that has the
effect of insulating the rationale from review, contravenes the purpose
of ERISA." 1 9 Again, there is nothing to suggest that the opinion re-
quires plans to always give the participant access to appeal-level re-
ports and therefore nothing to suggest that the Ninth Circuit's
holding was inconsistent with the rulings of the Eighth and Tenth
Circuits.
113. See Metzger v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 476 F.3d 1161, 1163 (10th Cir. 2007);
Abram v. Cargill, Inc., 395 F.3d 882, 885 (8th Cir. 2005).
114. Abatie v. Alta Health & Life Ins. Co., 458 F.3d 955, 974 (9th Cir. 2006).
115. See Abram, 395 F.3d at 885.
116. See Metzger, 476 F.3d at 1163.
117. See Abatie, 458 F.3d at 974.
118. Id.
119. Id.
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C. The Muddled State of the Law in the Wake of These Appellate
Decisions
A careful reading of the cases analyzed above reveals two general
principles that a plan in any of the three circuits should abide by.
First, if the plan is going to deny an appeal based on new facts or
a novel theory (in whole or in part), including tacking on an addi-
tional new theory to the original, it should provide the participant
access to the relevant documents before the final denial. It is arguable
that the Tenth Circuit does not require such access because of its rul-
ing in Metzger.120 However, because the court is careful in one sen-
tence to limit its holding to cases that do not involve novel grounds
for denial, 1 2 1 plans cannot safely rely on a bright-line rule that does
not require access.
Second, if the plan does not rely on a novel theory in its final
denial, full and fair review may not require that the plan provide the
participant access to appeal-level documents before the final denial.
Because the Eighth and Ninth Circuit cases involved new grounds for
denial on appeal and appear to limit their holdings to such situations,
they may not require access in a fact pattern similar to that of Metzger
(where there is no novel ground on appeal). In the Tenth Circuit,
plans can safely refrain from providing access when there is no new
ground for denial.
Thus, the law in this area remains unsettled by the conflicting
decisions from the Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits.
IV. Three Major Problems with the Current Regulations and
Courts' Interpretations of Them
The Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuit Courts appear to have nar-
rowly tailored their opinions to the facts of the cases before them.1 22
None of the three courts even attempted in dicta to clearly state what
the broader "full and fair review" requirements are in the appeal-level
document context. This is unfortunate because of the confusion the
three opinions have created in an area that is already dauntingly com-
120. Metzger, 476 F.3d at 1167.
121. See supra Part II.C.1 (discussing the Tenth Circuit's holding in Metzger that as long
as appeal-level reports contain no new factual information or novel diagnoses, two-phase
disclosure is consistent with full and fair review).
122. See Metzger, 476 F.3d at 1167; Abatie, 458 F.3d at 974; Abram v. Cargill, Inc., 395
F.3d 882, 886 (8th Cir. 2005).
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plex. 123 By carefully couching exceptions to their holdings, none of
the opinions establish a bright-line rule to assist plan administra-
tors. 124 Instead, three problems emerge. First, the current regulations
and courts' interpretations of them are not in the best interest of ei-
ther party in an ERISA benefits appeal because of issues related to the
timing of when claimants are given access to appeal-level documents.
Second, the law as it stands is inconsistent with the DOL's stated in-
tent.125 Lastly, plans now must conduct a difficult analysis of how their
denied appeal will compare to their initial denial, and in some cases,
provide documents before the final determination to ensure compli-
ance with full and fair review.126
A. Requiring Access to Appeal-Level Documents May Lead to
Delays for the Participant and Extra Costs for Plans
The appeal process is designed to last forty-five or sixty days. 127 If
plans are required to provide the participant access to appeal-level
documents during the course of an appeal, the rationale must be to
allow the participant to review and respond to those new documents.
Such access could logically serve no other function since the regula-
tions clearly require that the participant be provided access to appeal-
level documents upon final denial of an appeal. 128 Thus, any rule or
decision allowing participants earlier access to those documents must
be designed to give them an opportunity to respond before a final
decision is made.
Whenever a plan is required to provide documents during the
appeal, however, the forty-five or sixty-day time frame may be compro-
mised by the extra time needed for the participant to rebut. Metzger
123. See, e.g., Niles v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. 04-4060, 2007 WL 30607, at *12 (D. Kan.
Jan. 3, 2007) (demonstrating the general confusion that district courts face under the cur-
rent law); Hornback v. N.Y. Times Co. Long Term Disability Plan, No. 05-00508, 2006 WL
496050, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2006) (same); Harris v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 379 F. Supp.
2d 1366, 1371-74 (N.D. Ga. 2005) (same).
124. See Metzger, 476 F.3d at 1167 ("So long as appeal-level reports analyze evidence
already known to the claimant and contain no new factual information or novel diagnoses, this
two-phase disclosure is consistent with 'full and fair review."' (emphasis added)); Abatie,
458 F.3d at 974 ("[A]n administrator that adds, in its final decision, a new reason for denial
... contravenes the purpose of ERISA." (emphasis added)); Abram, 395 F.3d at 886 ("A
claimant is caught off guard when new information used by the appeals committee emerges
only with the final denial." (emphasis added)).
125. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
126. See Abatie, 458 F.3d at 974; Abram, 395 F.3d at 886; see also Metzger, 476 F.3d at 1167.
127. See ERISA Claims Procedure Rule, 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(i)(1)(i), 1(i)(3)(i)
(2007).
128. Id. § 2560.503-1 (i) (5).
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touches on this issue primarily in its concern about circularity (i.e., an
endless loop of submissions and rebuttals). 129 But if a plan is required
to provide access to documents during the appeal, such as in the
Abram and Abatie decisions, 130 the plan has no guidance as to when it
must provide such access. Even if the plan does provide the partici-
pant a reasonable time to rebut, the participant could simply wait un-
til the last minute to provide his evidence in response.
A participant's rebuttal in the final days of an appeal period
could lead to two unfortunate results. On one hand, the plan may
simply be unable to consider the appellant's response within the time
frame mandated by the regulations for its determination and there-
fore be forced to make a decision without taking into account the
participant's rebuttal. A regulatory system that allows this to fre-
quently occur is absurd since it would negate the reason for granting
the participant access to the document in the first place. It would also
violate section (h) (3) (iii), 131 assuming Metzger's interpretation of the
regulation is correct, for failure to have a medical professional evalu-
ate the evidence. 132 Furthermore, if the rebuttal evidence might sway
the plan's determination, the plan's adherence to the time deadline
instead of carefully considering the evidence could force the plan to
deny the appeal when it otherwise would not. The participant would
then have to unnecessarily expend time and money seeking counsel
and bringing an action in district court, undermining the value and
purpose of the administrative appellate structure. 13 3 This would also
further delay the participant's access to benefits and possibly put the
plan in an unfair position when sued for not having considered the
participant's potentially authoritative rebuttal.
Alternatively, the plan may invoke the special circumstances
clause of section (i) (1) (i). 134 This section provides that the forty-five
or sixty-day limit applies "unless the plan administrator determines
129. Metzger, 476 F.3d at 1166-67.
130. Abram, 395 F.3d at 886; Abatie, 458 F.3d at 974.
131. 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(h) (3) (iii).
132. Metzger, 476 F.3d at 1166.
133. For instance:
The Department is committed to ensuring that participants and beneficiaries are
afforded fair and timely reviews of their benefit claims. At the same time, the
Department recognizes that an orderly, efficient, and cost-effective implementa-
tion of the claims procedure rules by group health plans will ultimately benefit all
affected parties, including plan participants and beneficiaries.
ERISA Claims Procedure, 66 Fed. Reg. 35,886, 35,886 (July 9, 2001) (codified at 29 C.F.R.
pt. 2560).
134. 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(i)(1)(i), (i)(3)(i).
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that special circumstances . . . require an extension of time for
processing the claim [which must be no longer than an additional
forty-five or sixty days] .,,135 Exercising this option would allow the plan
to drag the administrative process along to the detriment of the par-
ticipant. In many cases, it will only delay the plan's inevitably unfavora-
ble determination and force the participant to wait even longer to
bring an action. In theory, the extension may allow the plan to fully
review the rebuttal evidence, approve the claim, and save both parties
the expense of litigation. Unfortunately, the likelihood of this ideal
result is heavily outweighed by the potential for abuse.136
B. All Three Circuits Fail to Comply with the Department of
Labor's Intent
Metzger's strongest argument against allowing participants access
to documents during the appeal is that it would contravene the DOL's
intent in creating the amended regulations. The DOL stated its rea-
son for the addition of 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1 (in) (8) was to define
relevant documents for full and fair review in terms of a final denial:
As a concomitant to this general requirement, subparagraph
(m) (8) (iii) further provides that, among the information that a
plan must provide a claimant upon request after receiving an adverse
benefit determination, is any information that the plan has generated
or obtained in the process of ensuring and verifying that, in mak-
ing the particular determination, the plan complied with its own
administrative processes and safeguards that ensure and verify ap-
propriately consistent decisionmaking [sic] in accordance with the
plan's terms.
135. Id.
136. See, e.g., Donnell v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 165 F. App'x 288, 297 (4th Cir. 2006)
(holding that a plan that fails to meet the outer time limit, even after invoking the exten-
sion, will not constitute an abuse of the plan's discretion unless there is a causal connec-
tion between the failure to meet the time limit and the final denial of the claim); Soltysiak
v. Unum Provident Corp., No. 05-148, 2006 WL 2884461, at *3 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 10, 2006)
(holding that the arbitrary and capricious standard of review, which is "'extremely deferen-
tial"' and "'the least demanding form ofjudicial review,"' applies even when a plan fails to
meet the extension deadline (quoting McDonald v. Western-Southern Life Ins. Co., 347
F.3d 161, 172 (6th Cir. 2003))); Seitz v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., No. 04-1003, 2005 WL 715932,
at *17 (N.D. Iowa Mar. 30, 2005), rev'd on other grounds, 433 F.3d 647 (8th Cir. 2006) (hold-
ing that the court will infer abuse of a plan's discretion for failure to meet the extension
deadline only when the irregularity is "'so egregious that the court has a total lack of faith
in the integrity of the decision making process'" (quoting Tillery v. Hoffman Enclosures,
Inc., 280 F.3d 1192, 1199 (8th Cir. 2002))). But seejebian v. Hewlett-Packard Co. Employee
Benefits Org. Income Prot. Plan, 349 F.3d 1098, 1103 (9th Cir. 2003) (applying the de novo
standard where a plan deems a claim denied after the expiration of a certain time period).
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The Department believes that this specification of the scope of the
required disclosure of "relevant" documents will serve the interests
of both claimants and plans by providing clarity as to plans' disclo-
sure obligations, while providing claimants with adequate access to
the information necessary to determine whether to pursue further
appeal. 13 7
The DOL's stated intent demonstrates that its concept of "full
and fair review" applies to the initial denial. 138 The participant is enti-
tled to a full and fair review of the information and evidence that led
the plan to deny the claim. 139 If new information is discovered during
the appeal, the plan should have the right to use it against the partici-
pant in creating a new theory. 140 When the appeal is denied, the par-
ticipant should be provided the relevant documents that the plan
relied on in bringing its novel theory. 14 1 The participant can then re-
view these documents and determine whether to pursue an appeal by
filing a claim in district court. 14 2
The Eighth and Ninth Circuits likely viewed the DOL's above-
quoted intent not as an exhaustive coverage of when plans must pro-
vide a participant access, but merely one instance where it is applica-
ble. 143 The fact that plans must provide access following a denial does
not foreclose the possibility of access being required at an earlier
time. But in such a highly regulated field, there ought to be a pre-
sumption that the lack of a regulation directing access during the
course of an appeal is significant. If the DOL intended to require ac-
cess to documents under any circumstance, during the course of an
appeal, why would its regulations only explicitly require access to doc-
uments at the outset and completion?" 44
137. ERISA Claims Procedure, 65 Fed. Reg. 70,246, 70,252 (Nov. 21, 2000) (codified at
29 C.F.R. pt. 2560) (emphasis added).
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. See Abatie v. Alta Health & Life Ins. Co., 458 F.3d 955, 974 (9th Cir. 2006); Abram
v. Cargill, Inc., 395 F.3d 882, 886 (8th Cir. 2005).
144. See Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 209 (2002) ("We
have observed repeatedly that ERISA is a 'comprehensive and reticulated statute' .....
(quoting Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 251 (1993))); see also Transamerica Mort-
gage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 19 (1979) ("[I]t is an elemental canon of statutory
construction that where a statute expressly provides a particular remedy or remedies, a
court must be chary of reading others into it."); Botany Worsted Mills v. United States, 278
U.S. 282, 289 (1929) ("When a statute limits a thing to be done in a particular mode, it
includes the negative of any other mode.").
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Despite the Tenth Circuit's attempt in Metzger to analyze and
comply with the DOL's stated intent, it also fails. The Metzger court
leaves a gaping exception by failing to distinguish the case presented
with differing factual situations, as illustrated by the cases from the
Eighth and Ninth Circuits.1 4 5 By declining to create a bright-line rule
against requiring access to appeal-level documents, the court left the
door open for requiring access in factual situations more similar to
Abram and Abatie, which again contravenes the DOL's intent.
C. Determining Whether the Plan Relied on a Novel Ground
All three circuits appear to ground their holdings on whether the
plan relied on the appeal-level documents in creating a new reason
for denying the claim on appeal. 146 This is problematic, even when
the plan indisputably changes its basis for denial on appeal, because it
contradicts the DOL's intent"47 and creates the potential for time de-
lays and additional expenses. But placing such crucial significance on
whether the plan relied on a novel ground may in itself cause
problems by forcing litigation to focus entirely on this ancillary issue.
For instance, what if a plan only slightly changes its reasoning in
denying an appeal? Will courts have to develop a rule that determines
whether the change is substantial or material? And if so, how much
time and money will be wasted litigating that point? Furthermore,
courts will be forced to determine whether they agree with the Abatie
holding, which implied that tacking on an additional ground consti-
tutes a novel ground for document access purposes.1 48
Any focus on a plan's altered grounds for denial also opens the
door for plans to abuse the system. Plans might regularly decide not to
change their grounds for denying a participant's claim on appeal to
avoid having to provide document access to the participant and to
save the cost of addressing the participant's rebuttal evidence. Alter-
natively, plans may regularly, and without cause, change their grounds
on appeal in order to invoke the special circumstances time exten-
145. See discussion supra Part II.C.1 ("So long as appeal-level reports analyze evidence
already known to the claimant and contain no new factual information or novel diagnoses,
this two-phase disclosure [at the outset and conclusion of the appeal] is consistent with
'full and fair review.'" (quoting Metzger v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 476 F.3d 1161,
1167 (10th Cir. 2007))).
146. See Metzger, 476 F.3d at 1167; Abatie, 458 F.3d at 974; Abram, 395 F.3d at 886.
147. ERISA Claims Procedure, 65 Fed. Reg. 70,246, 70,252 (Nov. 21, 2000) (codified at
29 C.F.R pt. 2560) ("[A] plan must provide a claimant upon request after receiving an
adverse benefit determination .....
148. Abatie, 458 F.3d at 974.
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sion, thereby delaying payment on claims as long as possible. This
would undermine the regulatory intent to limit the extension to spe-
cial circumstances. 149 Thus, this final problem highlights the need for
a clear and concise approach to handling access to appeal-level docu-
ments during the appeals to decisions of ERISA claims for benefits.
V. A Suggested Regulation That Does Not Require Access to
Appeal-Level Documents but Creates an Incentive for
Plans to Provide Access
The proposed amendment would add a new regulation to clarify
that full and fair review does not require that plans provide access to
appeal-level documents during the course of an administrative appeal.
It attempts to do so in a manner that benefits both plans and plan
participants.
A. Proposed Amendment: A Bright-Line Rule
The ERISA Claims Procedure Rule, 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1 (i) (2),
requires that plans provide the claimant with all documents relied
upon for review following an adverse determination. 15 0 The suggested
amendment adds a new subparagraph foreclosing any interpretation
of full and fair review to require access during an appeal. However, it
creates an incentive for plans to provide documents to promote plan
disclosure and participant access in the spirit of the plain meaning of
full and fair review. The suggested regulation also creates the neces-
sary procedural framework to ensure that appeal-level access operates
efficiently and without undue burden on either party.
SUGGESTED REGULATION 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1 (i) (5) (i):15 1
The plan is not required to provide the claimant access to docu-
ments generated during the course of the appeal before making a
final determination.
However, if the plan denies an appeal by relying, in whole or in
part, 152 on a novel theory or facts not considered in the original
denial of the claim and does not provide the claimant access to the
documents setting out such a novel theory or new facts at least 15
149. ERISA Claims Procedure Rule, 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1 (i) (1) (i) (2007).
150. Id. § 2560.503-1 (i) (2).
151. Currently there is no regulation labeled 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(i)(5) (i). This pro-
posed codification is designed to immediately follow 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1 (i) (5), which
regulates the furnishing of documents. Id. § 2560.503-1 (i) (5); see also discussion supra Part
I.
152. The Federal Register should note that the Department of Labor intends for the
phrase "in whole or in part" to cover the tacking on of an additional ground, as in Abatie,
458 F.3d at 974.
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days before denying the appeal (no later than the 30-day mark for
a disability claim or the 45-day mark for any other welfare plan
claim), the plan, if sued by the claimant following denial of the
appeal, will have to overcome a rebuttable presumption that the
documents were intentionally withheld to deny the claimant a full
and fair review. The plan can overcome this presumption by dem-
onstrating that it acted reasonably and in good faith.
If the claimant, after receiving documents setting out a novel the-
ory or new facts during the appeal, then submits new medical evi-
dence as a rebuttal to those documents within the applicable
appellate time frame[two words], the plan will have twenty extra
days (no later than the 65-day mark for a disability claim or the 80-
day mark for any other welfare plan claim) to consider the rebuttal
evidence and make its determination of the appeal. This 20-day
extension will operate to the exclusion of paragraph (i) (1) (i).
153
The claimant has no right to access or rebut documents generated
by the plan during the course of this 20-day extension. The plan
shall provide such documentation upon an adverse determination.
Paragraph (i)(5)(i) shall not apply to paragraph (i)(2).15 4
B. The Proposed Regulation Will Benefit Both Plans and
Participants
Plan participants might assume that requiring access to appeal-
level documents during an appeal would only benefit them, but the
right to a "full and fair review" cannot be viewed in isolation. In light
of the larger regulatory scheme and its effects, as described in Part VI,
participants should also be concerned that such access would delay
the administrative process and ultimately act to their detriment. Al-
though such a delay may, in some cases, benefit participants by al-
lowing them to successfully rebut the plan's new evidence and win
their appeals, thereby avoiding the delay and the costs of litigation, in
many cases the added time would only postpone an inevitable
denial.155
Similarly, while plans may have the opportunity to delay payment
of expensive benefit claims, the proposed rule will not work to their
153. 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(i)(1)(i), (i)(3)(i), provides for special circumstances by
extending the appeals process forty-five days for a disability claim and forty-five days for any
other welfare plan claim. Id.
154. 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1 (i) (2) provides review procedures for group health plans,
including different deadlines for pre- and post-service claims, as well as the option to pro-
vide two levels of appeals with shorter deadlines. Id. The suggested regulation could be
modified to apply to group health plans under paragraph (1)(2), but that possibility is
beyond the scope of this Comment.
155. See Carole Roan Gresenz et al., Patients in Conflict with Managed Care: A Profile of
Appeals in Two HMOs, 21 HEALTH AsF. 189, 194 (2002), for an analysis of the appeals pro-
cess detailing participants' appeal success rate at two major plans.
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exclusive benefit either.1 56 The proposed regulation adds administra-
tive requirements that are likely to be expensive. 157 Also, the cost of
determining whether the participant is entitled to new documents,
along with the cost of addressing participants' rebuttal evidence, is
likely to be significant. 58
A rule that requires more administrative processes in an already
highly regulated procedure will be detrimental to both plans and par-
ticipants. 15 9 The DOL did not intend to require access to documents
during appeal, 160 plans almost certainly do not want to be forced to
provide such access, and participants are not necessarily benefited by
such access since it will create delays arising from their new responsi-
bility to rebut appeal-level arguments. Therefore, the DOL should
eliminate this confusion in its next set of amendments by drafting a
regulation, such as the one suggested above, which explicitly requires
access only upon final denial of an appeal.
This proposed amendment will create an incentive, but not a re-
quirement, for plans to provide the participant access to documents
during an appeal. Like a shareholder vote or approval by a disinter-
ested board committee in corporate law, 161 providing the documents
would grant the plan a safe harbor. In the situations where it is not
feasible or beneficial for the plan to provide access to appeal-level
documents, the plan would have to rebut the presumption that it in-
156. In fact, it will likely be of greater benefit to the participant. See discussion infra
Part VI.D.
157. See, e.g., Steffie Woolhandler et al., Costs of Health Care Administration in the United
States and Canada, 349 NEw ENG. J. MED. 768, 769 (2003) (demonstrating that health plans
in the United States already spend approximately three times more on administrative costs
than health plans in Canada).
158. See generallyJames G. Kahn et al., The Cost of Health Insurance Administration in Cali-
fornia: Estimates for Insurers, Physicians, and Hospitals, 24 HEALTH AFF. 1629 (2005) (discuss-
ing the administrative costs of health plans in California); MARK E. LITOW, MEDICARE
VERSUS PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE: THE COST OF ADMINISTRATION (2006), available at
http://www.cahi.org/cahicontents/resources/pdf/CAHiIMedicareTechnicalPaper.pdf
(demonstrating that private health plans spend more on administrative costs than
Medicare).
159. See generally Kahn et al., supra note 158, at 1629 (discussing the problems with
excessive administrative costs).
160. ERISA Claims Procedure, 65 Fed. Reg. 70,246, 70,252 (Nov. 21, 2000) (codified at
29 C.F.R pt. 2560).
161. See generally Benihana of Tokyo, Inc. v. Benihana, Inc., 906 A.2d 114, 120 (Del.
2006) ("Section 144 of the Delaware General Corporation Law provides a safe harbor...
[where] 'the board.., in good faith authorizes the contract or transaction by the affirma-
tive votes of a majority of the disinterested directors .... '" (quoting DEL. CODE A.NN. tit. 8,
§ 144(a) (2008))); Marciano v. Nakash, 535 A.2d 400, 405 n.3 (Del. 1987) ("[Alpproval by
fully-informed disinterested directors under section 144(a)(1), or disinterested stockhold-
ers under section 144(a) (2), permits invocation of the business judgment rule . . ").
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tentionally withheld documents by showing that it acted reasonably
and in good faith. Thus, the rule is designed to encourage access in
the spirit of full and fair review while avoiding the costly detriments to
both sides that may result from a more rigid rule.
VI. The Effect of the Proposed Regulation
Claimants will benefit from the proposed amendment to the CFR
in three ways. First, claimants will be able to react to documents and
challenge them within the appellate time frame. Second, the plan will
have an incentive to act more quickly. Finally, claimants will benefit
from an early indication of the plan's reaction to the participant's evi-
dence on appeal.
A. Claimants Will Be Able to Rebut Appeal-Level Documents
Within the Appellate Period
The primary purpose of the proposed regulation, and its most
significant potential achievement, is that it would provide a meaning-
ful appeals process for the claimant. In Lammers, the court held that
the claimant was entitled to access documents during the appeal, but
not the opportunity to rebut with new medical evidence. 162 The court
reasoned that the plan must be able to close the evidentiary record to
avoid an endless cycle of submissions. 163 However, the inherent con-
cept of full and fair review requires that claimants at least have some
chance of arguing the merits of their claims during the appeals pe-
riod.164 Not allowing claimants to submit new medical evidence would
hamstring their ability to rebut the novel theory or evidence on ap-
peal and greatly diminish the value of the document access.
Under the proposed regulation, if a document the plan relies on
is false, misguided, or simply states the need for more information (as
in Abram) ,165 the claimant will have at least fifteen days to point out
the error and rebut it with new medical evidence before the appeal is
decided. This will ensure a meaningful administrative appeals process
and have the added benefit of reducing the parties' dependence on
the federal judicial system since the administrative remedy will func-
162. Lammers v. Am. Express Long Term Disability Benefit Plan, No. 06-CV-1099, 2007
"AFL 2247594, at *2 (D. Minn. Aug. 2, 2007).
163. Id.
164. See ERISA Claims Procedure, 42 Fed. Reg. 27,426, 27,426 (May 27, 1977) ("As part
of the review the participant must be allowed to see all plan documents and other papers
which affect the claim. The participant must be allowed to argue against the denial .. .
165. Abram v. Cargill, Inc., 395 F.3d 882, 886 (8th Cir. 2005).
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tion more effectively to resolve the claim. Furthermore, it will not suf-
fer from the possibility of an endless cycle of submissions as feared in
Metzger and Lammers because the rebuttal will be the claimant's final
chance to submit new medical evidence, and the plan will have a fixed
twenty day period to review it.166
To provide a full and fair review, the rule's incentive structure
should be strong enough that plans will provide participants with ac-
cess to appeal-level documents during the course of the appeal in
most cases in which the plan relies on a novel ground.167 In the cases
in which the plan does not rely on such a ground, both parties will
benefit from an explicit rule not requiring disclosure because the plan
will be able to make a final decision within the appellate period.
When a plan does not become aware of the grounds to deny an
appeal until it is too late to provide the relevant documents to the
claimant (at least fifteen days in advance of the determination), the
outer time limit (forty-five or sixty days) remains in place. Plans will
not be forced to provide extra time for the participant to rebut the
late-arriving evidence or face liability for not giving the participant
access, and participants will not be forced to deal with impossibly
short time frames or time extensions that will delay their ability to
bring an action in federal court. The suggested structure will allow a
claimant to quickly take a claim to court under all circumstances and
with the added aid of the plan having to overcome an adverse
presumption.
B. Claimants and Plans Will Benefit from an Expedited Appeals
Process
The proposed regulation will encourage plans to make appellate
decisions more quickly. By generating the documents necessary to
deny the appeal at least fifteen days before making a determination
and concurrently passing those documents on to the claimant, plans
will immunize themselves from liability for failing to give a full and
fair review. This access will be the greatest advantage of the new rule
for the claimant because the documents will provide not only the req-
uisite information to rebut if appropriate but also an invaluable in-
sight into the plan's forthcoming decision.
166. See Metzger v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 476 F.3d 1161, 1166 (10th Cir. 2007);
Lammers, 2007 WL 2247594, at *2.
167. See 42 Fed. Reg. at 27,426.
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During the course of an appeal, if a plan generates a novel docu-
ment that is highly unfavorable to the claimant, the plan is likely to
rely on it in denying the appeal. Plans may still need time to analyze
the situation before making a final determination, and they will have
at least twenty days to do so if they opt to take advantage of the regula-
tion's safe harbor.
C. Claimants Will Receive an Earlier Notification of the Plan's
Intent
Under the proposed regulation, the claimant will also get invalua-
ble insight into the plan's forthcoming decision. Assuming some plans
will always wait until the appellate deadline to maximize profits, which
is generally unavoidable in a system of deadlines, 168 claimants will
often be able to see the plan's hand fifteen days earlier than the cur-
rent regulations require.
Where the claimant receives appeal-level documents during the
course of the appeal, and these documents provide a legitimate and
indisputable basis for denying the appeal, the claimant likely will have
effectively received his or her determination fifteen days before they
otherwise might have. 169 This earlier notification may be helpful to a
claimant who has an interest in knowing whether the claim will be
approved as quickly as possible. For someone who is seeking claim
approval to deal with formidable bills, the shortened time frame may
help the claimant avoid missing payment deadlines. 170 The advance
notice of a looming adverse determination will at least give the claim-
ant the advantage of an earlier opportunity to either secure other
funds or contact a lawyer in anticipation of bringing a claim in federal
court.
It should also be clear that although the rebuttable presumption
will be a hurdle for plans when they do not meet the fifteen-day safe
harbor deadline, it will not be so high as to substantially disrupt the
careful balance between the interests of the plan and the participant.
The plan will have to overcome an adverse presumption by showing
168. For example, the ERISA Claims Procedure Rule, 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1 (i) (1) (i)
(2007), states that decisions should be made within a reasonable time, establishing dead-
lines only as an outer barrier. However, the outer deadline (sixty days for most welfare plan
claim appeals) sets the only hard time frame to discuss with regard to the proposed regula-
tory amendment. An alternative amendment might seek greater reliance on a reasonable-
ness clause. Any such reliance, however, would place an incredibly difficult burden on a
claimant to determine how a plan acted behind closed doors.
169. See discussion supra note 168.
170. See discussion supra note 168.
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that some part of the administrative appeals process made it difficult
to provide the reports to the participant within the shortened time
frame. The plan must show that it did not intentionally withhold the
relevant documents to deny the participant access. This could be done
by providing evidence that the plan was unable to determine the
novel ground and generate the resulting documentation until it was
too late.
That is not to say that the adverse presumption will be easy to
overcome. The presumption must be difficult to overcome if the in-
centive structure is to have teeth. The premise behind the suggested
regulation is that the safe harbor should be enticing enough to lure
the plans into providing document access to the participants in the
vast majority of applicable cases. Plans should find it advantageous to
speed up the process and provide the participant access because,
given the volume of appeals a plan will be confronted with, it will be
less expensive to provide access and ensure immunity than to incur
the risk of liability and the costs of litigating even a small number of
cases.
D. The Proposed Regulation Tips the Balance Slightly in Favor of
Participants' Needs
The suggested approach attempts to strike an appropriate bal-
ance between the interests of both plans and participants. However,
this approach also recognizes that the overarching statute from which
the regulation derives seeks to protect participants by guaranteeing
"full and fair review" of their claims, 171 and therefore the suggested
regulation does slightly favor the claimant. Plans may not be pleased
by what they perceive as an effective fifteen-day curtailment of the
time they have to determine appeals and by the presumption they will
face if they fail to provide the relevant documents within the required
time frame. They may also object to the expense of consulting with a
medical professional once more during the administrative process,
as may be required where a participant rebuts appeal-level
documents. 72
171. 29 U.S.C. § 1133(2) (2000).
172. SeeMetzgerv. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 476 F.3d 1161, 1166 (10th Cir. 2007)
("If plaintiff were allowed to rebut the opinions of professionals consulted at [the adminis-
trative appeal] stage, then the layman claims administrator would once again be faced with
the possibility of receiving new medical opinions and judgments from plaintiff's experts.
Subparagraph (h) (3) (iii) specifically requires such evidence be evaluated by qualified
healthcare professionals .. . ." ).
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However, the suggested approach is based on the philosophy that
it would be safer to err in favor of the participant. Participants face the
much more difficult burden of having to fight large, well-funded, and
experienced plans, and they also struggle with finding counsel to han-
dle their cases. 173 Regulations should recognize the uphill struggle
that participants face in this situation. At the same time, the courts
naturally will be more forgiving of plans if they regularly provide ac-
cess within the fifteen-day buffer. If plans frequently provide claimants
document access, courts will be more likely to believe they have a legit-
imate reason whenever they do not provide access. These rewards
should generally be welcomed by both sides.
E. Two Unresolved Issues: Determining Whether the Plan Relied
on a Novel Ground and Lengthening the Administrative
Process
One of the problems with the current state of the law is that it
puts a heavy emphasis on whether the plan relied on a novel ground
to deny an appeal. 174 If the plan does rely on a novel ground, yet does
not provide the participant access to the relevant documents that
formed its basis for denial, the Eighth and Ninth Circuits will find that
the plan violated the participant's right to a full and fair review.' 75
The suggested regulation also considers whether or not the plan
relied on a novel ground as a factor for denial but does not place the
same degree of determinative significance on the issue. In no situa-
tion will a plan be held to have denied a full and fair review merely
because it relied on a novel ground on appeal without providing the
participant access to the relevant documents. Rather, if a plan did rely
on a novel ground without providing access, it will have to overcome
the presumption that it did so intentionally. If it is unclear whether
the plan changed its grounds for denial on appeal, the plan will have
a better argument that it did not intentionally withhold documents
173. For example, one attorney whose deceased wife was a participant in an ERISA life
insurance plan detailed his struggle to find a lawyer to handle his claim for denial of bene-
fits: "I could not find a lawyer to take the case! ... The last lawyer who turned me down was
the most sympathetic. She said that ERISA is extremely pro-business ...." MICHAEL H.
AGRANOFF, BEWARE OF ERISA (2008), http://www.agranofflaw.com/bewareoferisa.htm.
174. See discussion supra Part IV.C.
175. SeeAbatie v. Alta Health & Life Ins. Co., 458 F.3d 955, 974 (9th Cir. 2006); Abram
v. Cargill, Inc., 395 F.3d 882, 886 (8th Cir. 2005); see also Metzger, 476 F.3d at 1167 (sug-
gesting that the Tenth Circuit might come to the same conclusion if presented with similar
facts).
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because it believed the grounds on review to be materially similar to
the original.
The proposed regulation could eliminate the novel-ground in-
quiry entirely, but this result would place added pressure on plans to
provide access to participants when such access would be of little or
no benefit and may only confuse matters more. The participant's in-
terest in accessing appeal-level documents lies in gaining the ability to
rebut the plan's bases for denial during the administrative process. If
the documents contain no new reasons for denying the claim, the
claimants will have all they need from the evidence provided at the
outset of the appeal.
The proposed regulation also has the potential to lengthen the
administrative process by twenty days. If a plan provides appeal-level
document access to a participant during the course of an appeal, and
the participant submits rebuttal evidence before the review period
ends, the plan will have an extra twenty days to analyze the rebuttal
evidence and come to its conclusion. The added time is designed to
recognize the problems plans might face under section (h) (3) (iii),176
which requires plans to consult a medical professional. The Metzger
court interpreted this section as requiring a professional consultation
for a participant's rebuttal to appeal-level documents.177 Assuming
plans are required to do so, this will take more time. By providing
twenty extra days, the regulation will avoid placing plans in the unfair
position of not being able to adequately address the rebuttal, which
would thwart the administrative process.
While the proposed regulation will, in some instances, add twenty
days to the length of the appeal, it will only do so when such a delay is
legitimately needed. This delay only applies when a participant sub-
mits rebuttal evidence to appeal-level documents. Under the current
law, plans are able to add forty-five or sixty days to the length of an
appeal to address a similar situation by invoking the special circum-
stances extension. 178 The proposed regulation eliminates that possibil-
ity in favor of the shorter twenty-day time frame. Thus, although
participants may have to wait twenty more days for the conclusion of
their appeals, that trade-off is offset by the value of an effective ap-
peals process that avoids costly and time-consuming litigation, as well
as the avoidance of an even lengthier time extension that the plan
could invoke under the current law.
176. ERISA Claims Procedure Rule, 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1 (h) (3) (iii) (2007).
177. Metzger, 476 F.3d at 1166.
178. 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(i)(1)(i), (i)(3)(i) (2007).
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F. A New Complication-The Plan's Rebuttal: Demonstrating That
It Acted Reasonably and in Good Faith
The proposed regulation requires that if the plan relies on a
novel theory on review and does not provide the claimant access to
those documents within the fifteen-day buffer, it must show that it did
not intentionally withhold documents to deny the claimant his or her
right to a full and fair review. To demonstrate this, the plan must show
it acted reasonably and in good faith. A potential problem with this
requirement is that litigation may be necessary to determine exactly
what it means for a plan to act reasonably and in good faith.
However, the proposed regulation is designed with the hope that
the interpretation of this provision will rarely be an issue. The plan's
incentive to provide access when it will rely on a novel theory should
be strong enough to entice plans to do so in the vast majority of cases
where it is possible. Where, for example, the plan does not receive the
results of its decision until it is too late to notify the participant (be-
tween the thirty- and forty-five-day mark in a disability claim and be-
tween the forty-five- and sixty-day mark in any other welfare plan
claim), the plan should have no trouble demonstrating that it did not
intentionally withhold the documents because they were not yet
available.
If the plan acquires the documents it will rely on to deny an ap-
peal based on a novel theory before the fifteen-day window, it can
provide them to the claimant. If the plan is not able to acquire evi-
dence within the review period, it cannot use such evidence to deny a
claim. Therefore, the only situations in which the plan's reasonable-
ness and good faith will be at issue are those where a plan receives the
documents within fifteen days of the end of the review period. If the
plan argues that it was unable to acquire the documentation for a
novel ground until that fifteen-day period before the end of the appel-
late time frame, the issue will be whether or not it truly was unable to
acquire the documents until that time. For the plan to demonstrate
that it did not intentionally delay the acquisition of the documents to
withhold access to the claimant and thereby intentionally deny the
claimant a full and fair review, it will need to have the medical consul-
tant(s), who developed the novel ground for denial and created the
applicable documents, testify that the plan acted reasonably and in
good faith.
If the medical consultant testifies that the plan delayed in either
seeking consultation at the outset or relaying the consultant's docu-
ments to the claimant, the plan will not be able to rebut the presump-
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tion. If the plan did not inform the medical consultant of the time
frame for the claim, or advised the consultant that he or she could
wait until the fifteen-day buffer to come to a conclusion, the plan will
fail to meet its burden. In all other situations in which the plan ac-
quires the documentation for a novel ground within the fifteen-day
buffer time period, the plan should be able to successfully rebut the
presumption by demonstrating that it acted reasonably and in good
faith.
Conclusion
The law currently provides little guidance on the level of access to
appeal-level documents that a claimant is entitled to during an ERISA
welfare plan appeals process. To complicate the matter, judges con-
fronting this issue limit their holdings to the precise facts of the case
presented. Such holdings may be helpful for future participants and
plans in the exact same position and in the same circuit, but under
the current law too many appeals will require that both parties infer
how to proceed based on dicta and vague notions of what full and fair
review means. Compounding the difficulty of understanding the dif-
ferent circuits' approaches to a claimant's right to have access to ap-
peal-level documents, the relevant regulations fail to adequately
address this issue. Because of this, the Department of Labor should
amend the Code of Federal Regulations to clearly state that plans are
not required to provide claimants access to appeal-level documents dur-
ing the course of an appeal. With this proposed addition to the regu-
lations-using a rebuttable presumption to create an incentive for
plans to provide access-the process will come closer to achieving the
intended meaning of full and fair review.
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